How Do You Solve a Problem Like Hezbollah?

Maybe the title of this entry reminds you of a catchy tune from The Sound of Music. Well, now we all have to face the music because it looks like we've got a dilemma on our hands when it comes to Lebanon. Cute labels and patriotic bumper stickers can't get us past this one either. Namely, we have to figure out how on earth to positively participate in encouraging the political change occurring within the country without sparking renewed civil warfare or ignoring the fact that the nation's largest employer and one of its most successful political party is also a group with armed militias that have been involved in a variety of past terrorist actions.

Hezbollah isn't just a bunch of guys marching and denouncing Israel and the United States while wearing versatile black uniforms and head scarves, nor is it simply a populist political party or highly effective socially-minded corporation. Hezbollah is ALL OF THE ABOVE. Any real dealings with Lebanon in a post-Syrian occupation setting will have to incorporate this powerhouse (after all, amassing a 50,000 person strong protest takes a little political muscle). To make things even more sticky, Hezbollah is closely aligned with and largely supported by Iran, one of our friends in the "axis of evil." The situation calls for some serious thought and diplomatic sophistication on the part of the United States government.

How do we work with the Lebanese in establishing a democratic government committed to the rule of law and tolerance, a vital condition in a country as diverse and war-torn as Lebanon, while not budging on our stance that the United States does not work with terrorists?

On Hardball last night, the Washington Post's Robin Wright suggested that a situation akin to that of the IRA and Sinn Fein or the PLO may develop. In both instances, the government did business with the political wing of these groups once they had ostensibly committed to disarmament and denounced the use of terror. In both instances, armed factions of these parties continue to present the threat of terrorist action, albeit to a lesser degree than in the past. Ms. Wright's instincts on this seem entirely plausible and it is difficult to imagine what choice the government would have if this were indeed the situation that developed.

This being said, this author is not personally satisfied that this is good enough. There is something highly discomforting about turning a blind eye to a group's terrorist wing, just because they are no longer officially a terrorist organization, in order to engage with and legitimize its political (aka fund-raising and recruiting) wing.

Has any mention been made of having some sort of verifiable disarmament in pre-established stages that can be observed and enforced by a neutral party? Perhaps as Hezbollah's military capabilities are gradually stepped down in order to have time to develop state police and military organs for maintaining effective order, the level of political engagement could be graduated upwards. This method requires building trust in steps rather than granting it blindly, avoids creating power vacuums, acknowledges power bases already in existence, encourages Hezbollah to cooperate out of its own best interests, and reduces the likelihood that legions of foreign troops will be needed to stave off chaos, something a rather stretched US Military and reluctant international community are unlikely to undertake in any case.

Only by working with Druze, Maronite, Shiite, and all the other ethnic and religious parties in Lebanon can the international community hope to restore the luster to the land famed since Biblical times for it's mighty cedars, beauty, and wealth.

God-willing and with the good will of good men and women working for the ultimate good of Lebanon and the Lebanese, the mighty cedar of Lebanon will indeed inspire once again.